When reporting news of crimes, criminal suspects and related legal proceedings, it is essential that we strike a fair and reasonable balance between the need of the public to be informed and the effect upon the judicial process of publicity which may possibly be prejudicial. The following standards of self-restraint have been adopted to assist us in this effort:

There are clearly some circumstances where what we report in the way of crime news can result in a most serious miscarriage of justice. For example, if, prior to a trial, we detail the confession of the defendant or his/her prior police record, or present detailed "evidence" (interviews with people who allege that they have seen things or know things which establish the defendant's guilt), the result can well be that the courts will say that the defendant cannot get a fair trail. This is because the jurors, under our Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence, must render their verdict only on the basis of the evidence they hear in court. They cannot be infected by evidence that they have read or seen or heard outside the court - else the defendant is deprived of a fair trial. Again, for example, a defendant's prior police record is normally not permitted to be introduced as evidence in a trial - certainly not where the defendant does not take the stand.

Similarly, we know that under Supreme Court decisions over recent years, many confessions are barred from evidence because they are not voluntary, or because the defendant has been held by the police too long without arraignment or without a lawyer. Hence, if we report in detail on confessions or prior police records, we may be informing potential jurors of evidence most damaging to a defendant although, ultimately, that evidence never is presented to the jury and cannot, for good civil liberties reasons, be presented to the jury.

The net result has to be something that we as citizens would not want - that is, because of us, a defendant who may be guilty will be let off because he/she cannot get a fair trial. These restrictions (with the exceptions noted in the following paragraphs of this standard) on the broadcast of confessions, or of prior police records, or of evidence relating to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or a potential defendant, do not apply where there are public policy reasons for such broadcasts and it is not merely a case of passing along the information we get because it might be interesting to our viewers and listeners.

We still must fulfill the vital watchdog role of the press, particularly in the administration of justice. Consequently, where there are public policy reasons to do so, we can pursue every lead and report it - so long as it relates directly to a story or expose about the administration or miscarriage of justice and improper action or inaction of officials.

Watergate was, of course, a paramount example of this. The Wetumpkta story is a more obscure and less dramatic example: There, a young black [man] was hauled out of his car by the county sheriff and dragged into jail, and then was found dead in jail - and there was no indictment and no charge against the county officials. After a reasonable time had elapsed and it became apparent that there would be no official pursuit of the case, we reported eyewitness and other evidence that the sheriffs had brutally beaten the man. Here was a case where, indeed, the evidence went to the guilt or innocence of the sheriffs. But it was apparent that nobody was doing anything and hence there seemed clearly to be a miscarriage of Justice. In such cases no holds, except careful and responsible reporting, are barred and we go full-speed ahead. So, too, if a seemingly innocent person appears to us to be in the process of being rail-roaded to jail, we can and ought to report any evidence that we can find.

One other point - where a crime has been committed and there is no warrant or arrest or indictment for any particular person, we certainly can interview eyewitnesses (staying away, as is normally the case, from explicit fingering and identification of the alleged criminal by name) and carry, the pictures and description of the suspected fugitive released by the police. Further, where the police themselves or government officials violate the American Bar Association guidelines and publicly announce, in newsworthy circumstances, particular evidence pointing to the guilt of a person including confessions or prior police records, it is not incumbent on us to censor them if our news judgment otherwise indicates that some or all of their statements are worthwhile carrying. An extreme example of the latter is the instance where the Dallas Chief of Police waved a rifle in front of everybody and said that this was the rifle that Oswald had used and that he was clearly guilty. So, also, is the Nixon reference to Manson's guilt before Manson's conviction. These are things that we could not, and should not, suppress. Mr. Nixon and the police official may have been totally wrong, but we cannot put ourselves in the position of playing God and pretending, in these particular circumstances of significant public interest and importance, that the events didn't happen.

These basic, general principles will not give us a specific answer in every case and, in many instances, we shall have to make specific decisions based on the particular circumstances. But the stated principles should guide us in fulfilling our role of watchdog, particularly where the administration of justice is concerned, while, at the same time, we preserve the rights of defendants and prosecutors to a fair trial.

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